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The Action of the Imagination: Daniel Hack Tuke and 
late Victorian psycho-therapeutics 
 
 In 1884, on the publication of the second edition of Illustrations of the Influence of the Mind 
upon the Body in Health and Disease (hereafter shortened to Illustrations), British psychiatrist Daniel 
Hack Tuke (1827 – 1895) claimed there had been a ‘remarkable increase in the amount of intelligent 
interest felt in the more subtle relations existing between Mind and Body’ since he first published the 
volume a decade earlier (Tuke, 1884a). The most significant change from the first publication was that 
Tuke moved ‘volition’ from the first, and most prominent, example of the influence of the mind upon 
the body to the last (Tuke, 1870). Since the 1872 edition, the section on ‘emotion’ was the most 
expanded, highlighting this as the major method by which the mind could alter the physiological state 
(Tuke, 1872). This shift highlights changing notions of selfhood in the later nineteenth century. It also 
had practical implications for asylum psychiatry. If the emotions, and not the will, were considered 
the primary influence on a person’s physical and mental state, it was emotion with which moral 
therapy needed to engage. The ‘imagination’ – the idea Tuke used to describe the method by which 
the mind wrought bodily changes – thus became characterised less by the physiological model of 
reflex inhibition popular in the 1850s, but instead as a creative mental force. This new explanation for 
the value of moral treatment offers one possible reason as to why many asylum practitioners 
remained optimistic about the value of creative endeavours; despite overcrowding and administrative 
difficulties in asylums, art, entertainments and recreational pursuits increased in the final decades of 
the nineteenth century. Many institutions built dedicated entertainment halls from the 1870s on, and 
Bethlem Royal Hospital held perhaps the first public patient art exhibition in an asylum in 1900.1 
A model of mental functioning based on exciting emotion better supported ‘the practical 
application of the influence of the mind on the body to medical practice’, for which Tuke used the 
term ‘psycho-therapeutics’ (Tuke, 1884a: 2, p. vii). While the encouragement of a patient’s own self-
control had long been an element of asylum psychiatry, the use of emotional suggestion emphasised 
the role of the medical practitioner as well as calling on the patient’s own internal restraint. The advent 
of psychotherapy has generally been attributed to writers in continental Europe. However, Tuke may 
have been one of the earliest clinicians to use the term (Carroy, 2000: 11; Shamdasani, 2005: 1), 
indicating that greater analysis of Illustrations would be a valuable addition to the history of 
psychotherapy. It was in Illustrations that Tuke outlined what he meant by psycho-therapeutics, and 
how it might function, although he also drew on ideas he had touched on elsewhere. Tuke’s psycho-
                                                          
1 For example, in and around London, Caterham Imbecile Asylum opened a purpose-built theatre with stage as part of an 
extension in 1873, Normansfield Hospital in 1879 and Bethlem in 1900.  This contradicts the old assumption that increasing 
bureaucracy led to therapeutic pessimism (Scull, 1993). 
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therapeutics were not centred on the ‘talking cure’ for mental illness that we have come to associate 
with psychotherapy. The practice of psycho-therapeutics incorporated a wide variety of techniques, 
from the use of inert medication to hypnotism and, importantly, the influence of the physician in 
exciting emotional states such as faith and hope. In addition, Tuke considered psycho-therapeutics a 
valuable remedy for organic physical complaints as well as mental afflictions. Thus, he aimed to bind 
psychiatry (or psychological medicine, as it was known in Britain at the time) more closely to general 
medicine, emphasising the relationship between body and mind and drawing attention to 
‘imagination’ as an important mental force. In so doing, he incorporated elements of continental 
psychology – including contemporary debates over hypnotism in France – as well as older ideas on 
mental suggestion.2 
The strong connections between psychiatry and general medicine in the mid nineteenth 
century have led some historians to argue that psychological approaches to mental illness were 
unimportant to late nineteenth-century British alienists, as asylum psychiatrists were called (Clark, 
1981; Daston, 1982; Jacyna, 1982). More recently, historians have explored some aspects of hypnosis 
and suggestion in Britain. However, this has largely focused on experimental psychology rather than 
the practical application within asylum psychiatry (Gauld, 1992; Sommer, 2014; Valentine, 2012). In 
this paper, I aim to clarify the position of suggestion and mind-body relations in late nineteenth-
century British asylum psychiatry through a detailed explanation of what psycho-therapeutics meant 
to Tuke, who held a prominent position in late Victorian psychiatry. I focus on Illustrations, as the key 
text in which Tuke developed and outlined his notion of psycho-therapeutics, although this is set in 
the context of his wider work and writing, as well as some of his close colleagues. I begin with a sketch 
of Daniel Hack Tuke’s life, before looking at several major influences that shaped his interest in the 
relations between body and mind. First, his background as a Quaker and member of the well-known 
Tuke dynasty, founders of the York Retreat and promoters of the concept of ‘moral treatment’, had a 
key role in shaping Tuke’s approach. Subsequently, I explore Tuke’s interests in physiological 
psychology and somatic approaches to mind. Finally, I describe his research into hypnotism and the 
‘spiritual’ side of mental physiology. Today, these three strands of thought are often seen as 
conflicting, and Tuke himself has been represented in very different ways depending on which of his 
works is quoted. However, Daniel Hack Tuke’s concept of psycho-therapeutics is an under-explored 
example of the intersection between the somatic and the psychological, which was not unusual in late 
Victorian psychiatry. Acknowledging this aspect of the early concept of psycho-therapeutics can aid in 
following the ideas of some of Tuke’s contemporaries, emphasising the lack of clear distinction 
between body and mind in Victorian psychiatry. It also explains the ongoing relevance of moral 
                                                          
2 For more on the background of this see (Furst, 2008; Harrington, 2008; Mayer, 2002) 
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treatment as a therapeutic model in British asylums, as well as highlighting changes in the way moral 
treatment was understood, with increasing interest in emotional control and balance, rather than a 
sole emphasis on the power of the will. 
 
I. Daniel Hack Tuke and the Quaker origins of moral treament 
 Born in 1827, Daniel Hack Tuke was the great grandson of William Tuke, founder of the York 
Retreat and the son of Samuel, whose publication on the Quaker asylum widely publicised the 
methods adopted there (Tuke, 1813). His mother died soon after his birth and Daniel was raised by a 
‘deeply religious’ father with the help of an aunt and elder sister (Ireland, 1895: 377). Unlike 
previous generations of the Tuke family, who were lay asylum practitioners, Daniel studied 
medicine, receiving his MD from Heidelberg in 1853. He was well-travelled and well-read, in part due 
to the poor health from which he suffered throughout his life: a ‘weakly child’, his ‘delicate health 
retarded his education’ (Ireland, 1895: 377–8). Unable to follow a career in business, as his father 
did not consider him strong enough, the young Tuke initially tried law but soon dropped out. 
Instead, a chance visit to George Combe’s Phrenological Museum led him to embark on a career as 
an alienist. Ill-health continued to dog Tuke’s life, and much of his direct asylum experience came 
early in his career, at the York Retreat (Ireland, 1895: 378–9). In the 1870s, he moved to London 
where he had a rather sporadic private consulting practice, undertook lectureships, and was actively 
involved at the Bethlem Royal Hospital, where he was a governor for over twenty years, from 1871 
until his death in 1895. 
 In the second half of the nineteenth century, Tuke became well-known as an expert on 
psychological medicine and the history of asylum psychiatry. On his death, a ten page obituary 
formed the leading article in the Journal of Mental Science, the main English periodical in the field (it 
later became the British Journal of Psychiatry). Reflections by Tuke’s colleagues presented him as a 
serious, quiet and thoughtful man, perhaps of ‘nervous temperament’ and sentimental nature, who 
enjoyed discussion but disliked confrontation and appears to have been well-liked by those around 
him (Rollin, 1895: 719). One time president of the Medico-Psychological Association (the forerunner 
of the Royal College of Psychiatrists), co-author of one of the most popular psychiatric textbooks of 
the period (Bucknill and Tuke, 1879), and co-editor of the Journal of Mental Science for nearly 
eighteen years, Tuke was a highly regarded voice. Yet his work has received little attention from 
historians, although many use his textbook as representative of contemporary definitions of mental 
illness or cite extracts from his impressive compilation The Dictionary of Psychological Medicine 
(Tuke, 1892a) to highlight late nineteenth-century ideas in psychiatry. Tuke was a prolific and diverse 
writer, and this has led to confusion over how to understand him. Some of his texts have been used 
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as evidence of medical materialism,3 others as the reverse, particularly in relation to his interests in 
hypnosis and spiritualism.4 For Tuke, questions over the relationship between body, mind and soul 
dominated the study of normal and abnormal psychology, and the way he defined and understood 
the field in which he practised: as evidenced particularly in Illustrations. 
 Illustrations was first published as a series of eight articles in the Journal of Mental Science 
(1870-71) and expanded in 1872 in book form, revised in 1884. According to a colleague, Tuke 
‘always had a very strong personal affection for this book’ (Rollin, 1895: 720). Like many of his other 
publications, Illustrations was primarily a compilation of cases from medical and literary works: a 
tendency that saw the alienist characterised as a ‘scientific sponge, taking up greedily whatever was 
presented to him and rendering it back uncoloured by any personal tint’ (Rollin, 1895: 719). This 
quotation suggests that objectivity assumed to be possessed by the scientist, through his ability to 
dispassionately classify and understand diverse phenomena. Indeed, the initial series of Illustrations 
supports this, containing little in the way of discussion. Instead, Tuke categorised cases as to 
whether he felt the major influence of the mind lay in the intellect, emotions or volition (‘the will’), 
the three divisions of mind many of his contemporaries also adhered to.5 In book form, however, 
Tuke took greater pains to define his terms, as well as to explore the implications suggested by the 
examples. Most notably, it was here that he introduced the notion of psycho-therapeutics. If, as 
Tuke felt was unquestionably proved by some 350 pages of cases, the mind could produce disease in 
the body, the medical practitioner might make use of similar practices to cure illness. 
 Tuke’s examples were extremely diverse and do not necessarily describe conditions that we 
might understand as psychological, such as psychosomatic complaints or neuroses. He thought, for 
example, that emotional impact on the individual nervous system could affect almost any element of 
muscular action, digestion and sensation, inducing ailments as diverse as epilepsy, hydrophobia 
(rabies), tetanus, catalepsy and heart conditions. In the case of the heart, for example, Tuke argued 
that it was well-known that the emotions had an effect on the regularity of the heart’s function: 
sometimes, this could even be fatal (Tuke, 1884a: 1, 111-9).6 Indeed, the appearance of all the 
symptoms of a serious disease might be entirely due to the effects of the mind, such as hydrophobia 
as a result of being bitten by a dog. The rabies vaccine was not developed until 1885, and Tuke’s 
                                                          
3 See (Berkenkotter, 2008: 84; Scull, 2006: 120). Scull quotes Tuke stating of ‘the mad’ that ‘“no good” is plainly inscribed 
on their foreheads’: Tuke is actually talking about class and criminal heredity here, rather than insanity per se. (Tuke, 1878: 
171) . 
4 For example (Clark, 1981: 281). While Clark claims that most alienists rejected psychology, he considers Tuke one of the 
most interested. 
5 Many alienists at this time, including Tuke, stated (albeit incorrectly, for the idea pre-existed Bain) that they were 
indebted to Bain’s Association Psychology for this tri-partite division. For more on this see (Bain, 1855, 1859). The 
increasing popularity of this model is described in (Danziger, 1997: 64; Dixon, 2003: 70 & 158). 
6 Interestingly, some contemporary research has reached similar conclusions on the effects of emotional stress on the 
heart rhythm, including the potential to induce a heart attack (Finlay, 2014). 
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example highlights the difficulty of being certain that disease existed prior to the availability of 
conclusive tests (time, rather than a blood test, was the yardstick by which doctors made a rabies 
diagnosis). However, Tuke also used this example to criticise an exclusionist tendency among his 
colleagues. Some early nineteenth-century doctors had declared that all cases of rabies were caused 
by fear, rather than a virus; others that none were. This reflected: 
The strange tendency ...  among many reasoners, when investigating the causes of morbid 
phenomena, to range themselves under one of two exclusive extremes – the first attributing 
nothing and the last everything to the Imagination... (Tuke, 1872: 209) 
Tuke himself, while considering the mind to have an influence in almost every pathological state, 
thought that this power could often be exerted alongside another influence: an infection, genetic 
anomaly or other physiological cause. In addition, he regarded the will as an important influence for 
self-cure or control over physiological function. It was this self-influence that first inspired Tuke’s 
notion of psycho-therapeutics: however, the interaction between patient and practitioner 
demanded by such a notion also required explaining. Here, the individual will became far less 
prominent in comparison to the emotional influence that a doctor might have on his patient. 
 Today, it might seem surprising that a writer could claim the mind to be so central to 
experiences of bodily function, even though some of Tuke’s ideas remain common currency. 
Concepts like ‘the placebo effect’ – the idea that every treatment has an effect on our physiological 
system simply because we expect it to – indicate that we still consider mind and body to be 
connected, even if we don’t articulate it in the same ways Tuke did.7  Belief in the inextricable 
connection between mind and body was not a surprising one in a late Victorian context. Within 
psychiatry, this had long been an element of ‘moral treatment’, the therapeutic regime for mental 
illness developed by the Tuke family at the York Retreat (and, simultaneously, Philippe Pinel in Paris). 
Foregoing chains and openly coercive measures, the Tukes adopted a mixture of religious 
observance, a domestic environment, work and recreation to re-educate their patients (Digby, 
1985). Daniel Hack Tuke later claimed that his experiences at the Retreat shaped his choice of 
career: he grew up in and around the family institution and spent two years working on the wards 
before his MD, after which he returned as visiting physician (Tuke, 1892b: 57). Many of the Quaker 
principles underpinning the Retreat’s values remained important to Tuke, not least the rejection of 
dogma. He argued fiercely against ‘scientific snobs’: researchers so certain of the position of modern 
science that they refused to consider new ideas or divergent doctrines, especially those that 
                                                          
7 In his inaugural lecture at UCL, Sonu Shamdasani pointed out the paradoxical way in which the placebo effect developed 
from being an explanation of the way psychotherapy functioned to something that needed to be eliminated from clinical 
trials, thus presumably rendering psychotherapy ineffective in tests (Shamdasani, 2015). See also (Andersen, 2005; 
Harrington, 1997; Justman, 2011) . 
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threatened their supremacy (Tuke, 1884a: 1, vii). Indeed, it seems it was the increasingly formal 
nature of Quakerism that led the adult Tuke to diverge from the doctrine, although he remained 
convinced of many of its values (Ireland, 1895: 379). 
Quaker ideals remained enshrined in the doctrine of moral treatment, founded as it was on 
the belief that the insane were not absolutely deprived of reason, and thus could be motivated by 
hope, feeling and honour (Tuke, 1892b: 36). While this notion was adopted by psychiatry in later 
years, it emerged from religious rather than medical teaching. Tuke highlighted the same 
motivations inherent in the practice of moral treatment in the function of psycho-therapeutics: the 
physician should call on the patient’s honour, arousing the will and exciting hope of cure (Tuke, 
1884a: 2, 173-8). Psycho-therapeutics had some similarities, then, with the educative function of 
moral treatment. Many of the techniques used by asylum physicians throughout the nineteenth 
century were also those Tuke saw as psychotherapies: 
 The principle may be carried out, in a general way, by calming the mind when the body 
 suffers from excitement; by arousing the feelings of Joy, Hope, and Faith; by suggesting 
 motives for exertion; by inducing regular mental work, especially composition; by giving the 
 most favourable prognosis consistent with truth; by diverting the patient’s thoughts from his 
 malady; and thus, in these and other ways, inducing beneficially the functions of Organic 
 Life through the Mind. (Tuke, 1884a: 2, 282) 
 
The role of occupation and recreation was particularly important within the asylum (Ernst, 2015). 
Activities were thought to help divert the patient’s mind, avoiding the dangers of ‘morbid 
introspection’ (Clark, 1988). Yet Tuke’s outline of psycho-therapeutics also put the physician in a 
central role: it was he who, through his words and actions, was to calm, inspire, advise and reassure 
the patient. This strong-minded and influential physician also appeared in later depictions of moral 
treatment. John Charles Bucknill, the psychiatrist who wrote the diagnostic section of their joint 
textbook, described the ideal alienist as having: 
 A faculty of seeing that which is passing in the minds of men ... Add to this a firm will, the 
 faculty of self-control, a sympathising distress at moral pain, a strong desire to remove it, 
 and that fascinating biologising power is elicited which enables men to domineer for good 
 purposes over the minds of others. (Bucknill and Tuke, 1879: 663) 
 
Bucknill here alludes to the patient-practitioner relationship as the central element of psychiatry. 
Indeed, he did not reduce this to doctor-patient, stressing that attendants (untrained nurses) might 
have a similar influence to alienists. Unlike Tuke, Bucknill concentrated on the use of moral 
treatment in nervous and mental disease; Tuke’s psycho-therapeutics, however, was intended to 
cure a much broader array of illnesses. Moreover, Bucknill’s model of moral treatment remained 
couched in terms of the regulating influence of the will, and the power of one mind over another. 
The spiritual context of Tuke’s ideology brought the emotional content of the relationship to the 
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forefront: increasingly so, as the nineteenth century drew to a close, an idea picked up in French 
psychology, and later emphasised by Freud (Carroy, 2000: 14). 
 
II. Physiological Explanations of The Will 
Before looking at his emotional understanding of suggestion, it is worth considering the 
physiological underpinning of Tuke’s ideas. Although psycho-therapeutics bore strong resemblance to 
spiritual guidance, Tuke also claimed it to have a direct physical effect on the patient, and it was this 
that led him to extend the remit of psycho-therapeutics to diseases of the body as well as the mind. 
Here, he was influenced by the physiological psychology of the mid nineteenth century, in particular 
that of Thomas Laycock and William Carpenter, both of whom Tuke cited heavily (Carpenter, 1871; 
Laycock, 1869). The term physiological psychology encompassed these and other mid-century works 
that placed an emphasis on brain biology, associating intellect, emotion and – most importantly – the 
will with reflex action and the unconscious inhibition of nervous impulse (Smith, 1992). Although it 
was not necessarily a foregone conclusion that impulse either preceded or was superior to the idea 
that prompted it (and many writers did debate this point), a tendency to view brain biology as the 
dominant factor in mental health became widespread in late nineteenth-century psychiatric writing. 
This has been characterised as ‘medical materialism’ and most often associated with the work of Henry 
Maudsley (Jacyna, 1981; Maudsley, 1873, 1876). Medical materialism encouraged a pessimistic view 
of recovery by suggesting that the mad were tainted by their heredity: the ‘tyranny of organization’, 
as Henry Maudsley famously put it (Maudsley, 1873: 76). Tuke certainly saw Illustrations as fitting 
within this field, and often emphasised the physiological basis of his work. This included his early 
interest in phrenology: an anatomical fascination that colleagues claimed never left him (Ireland, 
1895: 379). While phrenology had lost credence as an explanatory model of mind by the late 
nineteenth century, it remained associated with the notion that mental functioning was primarily 
anatomical (Cooter, 1984). The second edition of Illustrations began with diagrams of the anatomical 
relation between mind and body by neurosurgeon Victor Horsley, indicating that the reader was to 
view the connection as a physical one. 
For Tuke, mind and brain could even be one and the same thing. As he remarked in the 
introduction to the second edition of Illustrations: 
Cases brought together in this volume will none the less illustrate the truth, and the 
importance of the truth, that the Mind or brain influences – excites, perverts, or depresses – 
the sensory, motor, vaso-motor, and trophic nerves, and through them causes changes in 
Muscular Contraction, Nutrition, and Secretion. (Tuke, 1884a: 1, 2) 
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The phrasing here suggests that the words ‘mind’ and ‘brain’ are interchangeable (although 
interestingly only ‘Mind’ is capitalised), emphasising the physical nature of psycho-therapeutics. 
Through such anatomical language, Tuke aimed to bring medicine and psychiatry into closer proximity, 
asserting that it was not, as commonly believed, solely in nervous or functional disorders that the mind 
had an influence on the body but also in many physical disorders, including of the skin, kidneys and 
bowels. The imagination, he rather dramatically concluded, was ‘a psychical virus … which can and 
does frequently kill’ (Tuke, 1884a: 1, 302). Conversely, he recommended psycho-therapeutics for all 
branches of medicine, vastly extending the potential remit of psychological medicine. In the 1884 
edition, Tuke supported these claims to physiological knowledge by including a letter received from 
Charles Darwin: endorsement of his ideas from a well-respected source (Tuke, 1884a: 1, 240). It does 
not seem likely, however, that the reverse was also true, in that doctors in other fields picked up 
Tuke’s ideas. He certainly attended sectional meetings of the British Medical Association, and may 
have had direct impact on some colleagues. However, Illustrations was not positively reviewed in 
clinical journals. A reviewer in the Lancet considered that Tuke’s conclusions did not advance the 
subject, and that his description of psycho-therapeutics was simply moral therapy by another name 
(Reviews and Notices of Books, 1873: 52–3). 
 It would be overly simplistic to cast Illustrations as a work of medical materialism. Despite his 
implication that mind and body were one and the same, Tuke (along with other psychiatric writers of 
the late nineteenth century) departed significantly from the language of nervous impulse found in 
earlier writers like Carpenter. One of Tuke’s followers, Bethlem physician Theo Hyslop (1863 – 1933), 
saw Tuke as having proven the limitations of studying mind through matter (Illustrations was, after 
all, about the influence of mind on body, and not vice versa) so that ‘no arguments hitherto adduced 
will allow us to grant that consciousness is a mere inert spectator of physiological processes.’ (Hyslop, 
1895: 12) Because the causal connection between the two aspects was unclear, Hyslop argued, mental 
physiology had to be seen from both sides, physiological and psychological. This shift away from the 
explicitly somatic can be seen in the way, between 1870 and 1884, Tuke changed the order in which 
he treated the three divisions of mind, moving ‘volition’ (emphasised by his predecessors, who saw it 
as analogous with nervous reflex action) from first to last. Illustrations expanded most in the section 
devoted to the emotions, with a further third of examples pertaining to intellect, while barely eight 
per cent were illustrated by Volition so that ‘the direct action of the Will, however important, is the 
least frequently exerted power in relation to the psycho-physical phenomena’ (Tuke, 1884a: 2, 299). 
Thus, Tuke claimed that ‘will’ could not be regarded as a pure element of mind at all, but instead 
‘composed of an emotional or active element, and an intellectual or regulative element’: this claim 
emphasised an ideational, rather than neurological-inhibitory, concept of volition (Tuke, 1884a: 2, 
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138). It was not just the emphasis on particular divisions of mind that had changed from mid-century 
physiological psychology, but the very content and understanding of these divisions, with the will itself 
partly constituted by emotion. 
 
III. Hypnotism and the Imagination 
 This changing understanding of the will indicates that we cannot regard physiological 
explanations of brain function and a correlation between mind and brain as necessarily leading 
towards psychiatric determinism at the close of the nineteenth century, as is often suggested (Bynum, 
1983; Scull, 1993). While the medical materialism previously outlined led some alienists to regard the 
potential for madness as pre-existing in an individual through heredity, even the most staunch 
materialists considered that surroundings also had an impact on the emotional balance and the 
emergence of mental illness. Instead, it is more helpful to view these factors alongside other concerns 
about the relationship between mind and body, including the potential existence of some additional 
life-force or motive power. The third element I want to explore in Tuke’s work – his research into 
hypnotism – was heavily associated with metaphysical concepts of selfhood. Although many of Tuke’s 
papers explored the physiological effects of hypnosis (on respiration, the pulse and the muscles), he 
combined these observations with subjective ones, for example the ‘loss of personal identity from 
suggestion’ (Tuke, 1865: 58, 1883, 1884b). In addition, he was interested in the possibility of studying 
madness through ‘artificial insanity’ produced by hypnotism: Tuke was among the British alienists who 
attended Charcot’s sessions in Paris in 1878 (Tuke, 1884b: vi). This interest is particularly evident in 
Illustrations via the mechanism Tuke used to explain the influence of the mind on the body: the 
imagination. But what did he mean by this term, which, it seemed, sat outside the three divisions of 
mind into which he had sorted his examples? 
 Imagination took on the appearance of an incontrovertible force. The term signified two 
things: ‘that a man imagines certain (bodily) phenomena to have occurred which have not; or ... that 
certain bodily phenomena which have really occurred, are due to no other cause than that he 
imagined they would.’ (Tuke, 1872: 180) In many cases, Tuke thought, the second clause was ignored, 
leading observers to assume that any results were as imaginary as the stimulus: ‘in other words, that 
they are “all fancy”’ (Tuke, 1872: 180). This was certainly what some previous investigators into 
hypnotic and mesmeric phenomena had claimed, dismissing the physical basis of such therapies by 
declaring the effects as due to imagination (Franklin, 1785). Yet Tuke was writing in an era when, on 
the continent, suggestion and imagination were under close investigation, in particular by Jean-Martin 
Charcot in Paris and Hippolyte Bernheim in Nancy. One of the prominent disagreements between the 
two researchers was whether everyone was suggestible, as Bernheim argued, or only the ‘hysterics’ 
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(those with a neurotic heredity), as Charcot claimed (Harrington, 2008: 58). Tuke appears to have been 
swayed by the former argument, defining imagination very broadly as ‘those ideas which arise without 
any direct external stimulus’ – a universal tendency (Tuke, 1872: 180). He was not, however, able to 
determine how these mysterious ideas arose, simply viewing imagination as some form of indefinable 
life-force. Tuke’s close colleague, George Savage (1842 – 1921), described a similar idea with the term 
‘motive power’, boldly declaring that ‘neurologists and physiologists are only the engineers who are 
studying the machinery, while we in asylums have the much more difficult problem of studying the 
motive power.’ (Savage, 1886: 315) What this ‘motive power’ was, he didn’t speculate, although later 
in life he admitted such a universal force must be closely related to metaphysical and theological ideas, 
although it could only be revealed through its relation to action (Savage, 1913: 17–18). Similarly, Tuke 
related the imagination to mental states which, within a religious context, had previously been viewed 
as originating not in the individual’s body or brain, but through an external all-powerful force: 
‘Expectation, Belief, Faith, Imitation, Sympathy, and Hope’ (Tuke, 1872: 18). Tuke’s concept of 
imagination suggested that idea preceded physiological reaction: indeed, that some inner creative 
force might pre-exist either intellect or emotion. 
There were several ways in which the imagination might prove useful to the alienist. 
Influenced by Tuke, all three Bethlem superintendents in the 1880s and 1890s (George Savage, R. 
Percy Smith and Theo Hyslop) experimented with hypnotism (Savage, 1909; Smith and Myers, 1890; 
Tuke, 1883). These alienists regarded hypnotism as a potential therapy for mental disorder. In early 
1883, Tuke and Savage (long-term collaborators and joint editors of the Journal of Mental Science) 
invited Carl Hansen, a Danish hypnotist, to experiment at Bethlem, and Tuke’s paper on the topic was 
presented to the next meeting of the MPA (Tuke, 1883). Tuke concluded that the mental condition in 
hypnotism was strongly related to that in insanity and, moreover, that suggestion might be used to 
cure physical and mental disease, absorbing the topic into his work in Illustrations. Savage, although 
sceptical at the time, thirty years later claimed to have reached a ‘stage of hope’ over the possibilities 
hypnotism offered as a treatment for nervous and functional disorders, as well as for investigating the 
functioning of the mind (Savage, 1909: 17). Percy Smith, meanwhile, indicated that hypnotism could 
be regarded as a continuation of Bucknill’s take on moral treatment, for ‘[t]he dominance of one 
human being over another, which is, for the moment at least, gained by its influence, seems in some 
ways more appropriate to the guidance and help of the insane by the sane.’ (Smith and Myers, 1890: 
191). Hypnotism, then, emphasised the individual relationship between patient and therapist, with 
‘imagination’ a way of describing the connection between the two. 
 Smith’s experiments in the late 1880s were the first direct contact between the Bethlem Royal 
Hospital and the recently founded Society for Psychical Research (SPR), set up in 1882 to investigate 
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spiritual, mesmeric and other psychical phenomena using a scientific methodology (Oppenheim, 
1985; Williams, 1985). In 1890, Smith published the results of his experiments into therapeutic 
hypnotism in twenty-one female Bethlem patients, made with A.T. Myers (physician brother of 
Frederic Myers, founder of the SPR). The hypnosis was carried out by the SPR’s G. A. Smith, a former 
stage hypnotist, although Myers, Percy Smith and Dr Goodall (clinical assistant at Bethlem) also made 
attempts to induce a hypnotic state (Gauld, 1992: 291). All of the patients hypnotised were female. 
The article gave no reason for this decision, although in one instance (Case VI) it was commented that 
the patient was chosen for her ‘considerable intelligence’ which, it was felt, would make it ‘easy to 
gain her attention’ (Smith and Myers, 1890: 206). Attention was a new focus in late nineteenth-
century psychology, particularly following the work of Théodule Ribot, and increasingly formed a 
chapter heading in textbooks (Ribot, 1890). This faculty, alienists claimed, was often lacking in the 
insane, making them harder to hypnotise: Dr Yellowlees later complained that his efforts at 
therapeutic hypnotism in the Glasgow Royal Asylum had been hampered by this factor (Bramwell, 
1898: 109).8 Attention, like imagination, emphasised the direction connection between patient and 
practitioner. 
It is possible that a larger number of female patients exhibited the symptoms that Myers and 
Smith wished to investigate. Their hypnotic suggestions concentrated on removing troublesome 
behaviour: wild and destructive acts, ‘dirty habits’ (incontinence), hallucinations and delusions and, 
prominently, refusal of food. Half the patients experimented on (10 out of 21) had been refusing food, 
and the suggestions made to these patients generally focused on encouraging them to eat. While 
there were certainly a large number of patients in Bethlem who refused food, particularly women, 
this was well under half the female population. In 1889, for example, the year in which the 
experiments were carried out, 51 of the 160 women admitted had refused food at some point, but 
only a third did so while in hospital. Some success in persuading patients to eat was the most 
encouraging result reported: ‘[c]ases I, VIII, and XVII. were very similar in symptoms, in all three 
refusal of food being the greatest difficulty to combat, and in all there certainly was some 
improvement in this respect after the attempts at hypnotism.’ (Smith and Myers, 1890: 213) All of 
these patients were in their teens and it was concluded that ‘the results gained would appear to have 
been due much more to the large amount of personal attention devoted to each case than to any 
hypnotic influence.’ (Smith and Myers, 1890: 213) Smith did not draw any conclusions as to the 
general benefit of personal attention, although all three patients were discharged cured. At Sussex 
House Asylum, Dr Huggard was far more enthusiastic, suggesting that hypnotism not only compelled 
                                                          
8 For more on attention, see the chapters in (Hyslop, 1895; James, 1890) 
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patients to eat but that this was achieved by ‘reaching and exciting to action long disused nervous 
channels’, indicating that physiological explanations remained a possible means of understanding the 
hypnotic influence (Tuke, 1884a: 2, 280). 
Smith, however, was less than convinced by therapeutic hypnotism, telling Bethlem’s 
governors that ‘the results have been extremely limited.’ (BRHA Annual Report 1889, 40) Despite this, 
he and Myers carried out further experiments in 1892 (this time unpublished)9 and Smith’s junior 
colleague, Theo Hyslop, investigated therapeutic hypnotism with John Milne Bramwell later that 
decade (Bramwell, 1899: 145). Hyslop was particularly influenced by spiritualist approaches to mind: 
in 1895, he was elected an Associate of the Society for Psychical Research (List of Members and 
Associates, 1895: 625). The same year he declared that: 
Among the insane, it [hypnotism] has been employed as a sleep producer, as a sedative in 
excitement, to dispel fleeting delusional states and the minor psychoses, to overcome morbid 
resistance of patients, and as a substitute for mechanical restraint. (Hyslop, 1895: 534) 
Refusal of food was part of this ‘morbid resistance’, and remained a dominant issue in therapeutic 
hypnotism: George Savage later used hypnosis to treat ‘nervous anorexia’ (Savage, 1909: 1211). 
Hypnotism’s success was explained by the restoration of ‘natural instincts’, such as self-preservation. 
Similarly, in an effort to dispel then-prevalent concerns around the potential use of hypnotism for 
criminal purposes, Bramwell suggested that the effect of hypnotism in the insane proved that it 
worked by increasing the individual’s ability to exercise his or her natural volition over morbid 
tendencies (Bramwell, 1899: 145). 
 Hypnotism in late nineteenth-century psychiatry was simply one method used to influence 
the behaviour of patients, a key aim of psycho-therapeutics. It was not an outright success, partly due 
to the difficulty alienists had in hypnotising their patients. Many came to see hypnotism as more useful 
in understanding and exploring the human mind than in therapeutic practice, as Tuke himself decided 
(Savage, 1909: 17; Tuke et al., 1890: 443). Theo Hyslop, in particular, drew on hypnotism and psychical 
research to explore parallels between ‘abnormal’ states of consciousness, furthering the view that 
insanity and mental health were proximate, such ‘that it is possible to interpolate an innumerable 
series of gradations between them [abnormal cases] and health.’ (Hyslop, 1895: 443, 1899: 782) While 
highlighting the individual relationship between patient and practitioner, British models of hypnotism 
continued to incorporate ideas of self-control and the influence of the will alongside metaphysical 
aspects of mind and emotion.  
                                                          




It was not, however, the only method incorporated into the concept of psycho-therapeutics. 
There were other ways in which the physician might harness the imagination as a psychological 
therapy. The use of placebo medication was another form of treatment, given by Tuke as a notable 
example of psycho-therapeutics. 
When a person on swallowing a bread-pill, in the belief that it possesses aperient properties, 
is purged, it is said to be Imagination ... That she is relieved is no Imagination. What cured her? 
Merely to say it was the Imagination is no solution of the problem. (Tuke, 1872: 181) 
This statement had both theoretical importance (could it help to reveal the motive force that caused 
an expected physiological reaction without the individual consciously aware of its mental origins?) as 
well as practical implications. Placebos had been known to medical practice since at least the late 
eighteenth century (Andersen, 2005: 105). The use of medication known to be inert certainly occurred 
in asylums in this period, for some alienists were concerned about the possible ill-effects of drugs, 
particularly sedatives (Savage, 1879). In 1899, Bethlem patient Charles C. insisted that he was unable 
to sleep without drugs. His case notes record that he slept well, ‘although only given a placebo’ (BRHA 
Casebook 1899, CB/160 -12). Charles’ physicians were well aware that an inert substance could lead 
to the same results as a psycho-active medication. However, there seem to have been few attempts 
in Britain beside Tuke’s to explain how this occurred. Utilising the concept of imagination simply 
replaced supernatural explanations of causation like for like: instead, Tuke thought the process by 
which the change occurred needed to be explored in greater depth. 
Over a hundred years later, this quandary over the so-called ‘placebo effect’ remains little 
explored. It is still an inexplicable link between body and mind, now largely considered a problem to 
be avoided and accounted for in clinical trials (Andersen, 2015; Harrington, 2008; Justman, 2011: 99–
101). Indeed, like Tuke’s concept of imagination, the placebo effect has become vast, confused and 
associated with negative ideas (Andersen, 2005: 107). Yet why should harnessing the power of the 
mind over the body not have been explored more directly as a treatment for mental and physical 
complaints? Tuke admitted that ‘misleading patients generally’ was ‘unseemly’ and in ‘danger of 
sullying [the] ... strict honour’ of the medical profession: in other words, it smacked of quackery (Tuke, 
1872: 196). This was also a major nineteenth-century concern over hypnotism, which, although 
explored by a number of alienists never achieved mainstream appeal.  
This context, however, indicates the way in which Tuke’s psycho-therapeutics was a treatment 
at the interface between body and mind. Unlike modern psychotherapy, late nineteenth-century 
psycho-therapeutics was both physiological and psychological, intended to treat nervous and bodily 
disease. Imagination, for Tuke, was not ‘fancy’ but a mental stimulus able to excite action in the body 
without any somatic cause. While his concept of psycho-therapeutics does not appear to have been 
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widely taken up, these ideas did influence the work of some of his successors, particularly at Bethlem, 
as well as spreading across the Channel; Illustrations was translated into French in 1886 (Carroy, 2013). 
Nonetheless, by Tuke’s death in 1895, some British colleagues already considered Illustrations to be 
out of date (Rollin, 1895: 720). This may have been due to the major role hypnotism played in psycho-
therapeutics; concern over the potential ill-effects of suggestion, and the associations with quackery, 
pushed alienists away from the theory as well as practice. Indeed, the idea of harnessing – or even 
widening discussion around – the ‘placebo effect’ remains a controversial one to this day. 
While physiological psychology improved the uncertain status of the alienist by associating 
him with general medicine, hypnotism did the reverse, indelibly linked with quack medicine and public 
spectacle in the minds of many (Gauld, 1992; Harris, 1988). This was particularly relevant when the 
emotional context of the individual’s will, as well as the relationship between patient and practitioner, 
was directly highlighted. Indeed, this shift emphasised suggestion (the influence of the practitioner) 
rather than the patient’s own imagination. As Lars Ole Andersen has recognised, this historica shift 
from imagination to suggestion and, later, the placebo effect, implies a move from concern for the 
patient’s own faculties in improving health (the internal power of the mind) to emphasise what the 
practitioner (and, later, the medicine itself) did to a patient (Andersen, 2005: 108). Importantly for the 
hisory of psychotherapy, then, Tuke’s psycho-therapeutics emphasised the therapeutic value of the 
patient-practitioner relationship in a way that had not previously been the case in asylum medicine. 
While Daniel Hack Tuke has been acknowledged as one of the first alienists to describe 
‘psycho-therapeutics’, there has previously been little interest in exactly what he meant by this term. 
As this article has shown, exploring the concept in greater depth in the context of Tuke’s background 
as a Quaker, his connections to moral treatment at the York Retreat and his other writings as an 
alienist, brings to light some important nuances to our understanding of late nineteenth-century 
mind-body relations. While the late nineteenth-century has often been viewed as a period in which 
psychological medicine in Britain was characterised by a deterministic reliance on the influence of 
heredity, Tuke’s writings show a closer relation between physiology and psychology, between the 
individual’s mental and emotional state and his or her health. In Illustrations in particular, Tuke 
emphasised the role of the emotions in influencing the imagination – a mental force that he thought 
could affect the body physiologically. While psychotherapy later became cast largely as a talking cure, 
for Tuke this biological element was important, explaining the connection between mind and brain, 
and situating psychiatry firmly within a medical realm. Through psycho-therapeutics, however, 
emotion also became a central part of the doctor-patient encounter. It was the patient’s own 
experiences of joy, faith and hope that would help lead to cure, particularly in psychiatry; however, all 
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these emotions could be harnessed and channelled by the physician. While Illustrations itself might 
have been neglected by many peers, other works by Tuke, such as his edited Dictionary of 
Psychological Medicine, continued to be referred to by colleagues into the twentieth century. Further 
work on the relationship of these texts to the concept of psycho-therapeutics, to mind-body relations 
and to interest in the emotional influence of the medical practitioner could raise further questions 
about the role of psycho-therapeutics in late nineteenth-century medicine – and, indeed, uncover a 
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